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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. OVERVIEW 
The United States Marine Corps has been employing tanks since 1925. The tanks 
utilized range from light expeditionary tanks such as the M2A4 during World War II to 
the medium M48A3 during Vietnam. Throughout, Marine tanks have performed 
operations designed to support the infantryman utilizing the tank's firepower, mobility and 
armor protection. In 1991 the Marine Corps replaced the M60A1 main battle tank with 
the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank. In doing so, they acquired a weapons system with 
significantly superior capabilities to those of the M60A1. 
The M1A1 is currently employed within the Ground Combat Element (GCE) of a 
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The MAGTF is the force structure the Marine 
Corps uses in deploying and employing Marine forces throughout the world. The 
MAGTF is composed of four elements: a Command Element (CE), a Ground Combat 
Element (GCE), an Aviation Combat Element (ACE) and a Combat Service Support 
Element (CSSE). The GCE conducts ground combat operations structured around an 
infantry unit which varies in size from an infantry battalion to a division. Combat support, 
including tanks, artillery and combat engineers, is also included in the GCE. The size of 
the tank unit supporting the GCE can vary from a platoon of four M1A1 s to a battalion of 
58 M1A1s. 
During the 1996 Armor Conference, an annual meeting ofMarine representatives 
of the armor community, the issue of what operations the M1A1 could perform in support 
of the MAGTF was discussed. The conference concluded that in addition to the 
operations the MlAl is currently performing, other operations exist within the overall 
mission of the MAGTF which the M1A1 is capable of performing or supporting. The 
conference believed that the employment of the M1A1 in these additional operations 
would enhance the overall combat power of the MAGTF. 
Since the introduction of the M1A1, the tank has been used almost exclusively as a 
separate element from the infantry, maneuvering against mechanized forces without regard 
for support the infantryman may require. While the conference believed this method of 
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employment was effective, they felt the MlAl was being underutilized as an infantry 
support weapon. Thus, the need was established to articulate both the capabilities of the 
MlAl and the operations this vehicle could perform in support of the MAGTF. This 
thesis will articulate the capabilities of the MlAl and the operations it could perform. The 
analysis will assist MAGTF commanders by informing them of the capabilities of the 
MIAI and the operations it is capable of conducting or supporting when Marine forces 
are employed around the world. 
B. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH 
The objectives of this study are to: 1) present the current capabilities and 
specifications of the MlAl employed by the Marines, 2) present the planned and potential 
future capabilities and specifications of the MlAl and 3) identify those operations the 
MlAl could perform in support of the MAGTF based on its current and future 
capabilities. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What operations could the MIAI tank perform in support of the Marine Air-
Ground Task Force ? · 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
a. What operations beyond typical tank operations is the MlAl capable of 
conducting in support of the MAGTF? 
b. What are the current capabilities of the Marine Corps' MlAl tank? 
c. What future modifications to the MlAl tank will improve the MAGTF 
Commander's ability to dominate the battlefield? 
d. What role will the MIAI play in the Marine Corps' evolving doctrine of 
Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS)? 
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D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1. Overview 
The research and collection of data for the thesis is qualitative in nature. The 
analysis and presentation ofliterature on the employment of tanks will address the 
operations previously performed as well as those they currently perform. Literature 
review and data collection were used to determine the current and future capabilities of 
the MlAl. Analysis of lessons learned from previous Army and Marine Corps 
experiences with the MlAl, interviews with selected armor leaders, and notes from 
discussions at the Armor Conference are used to address those operations tanks could 
perform in support of the MAGTF. 
2. Inclusion of Army Data 
The discussion on the Army's methods of tank employment, as well as lessons 
learned from their operations with the MlAl and information on the similar capabilities of 
the Army's and Marines' MlAl in following chapters, will assist in analyzing the 
operations of Marine tanks addressed in Chapter V. While this thesis is not designed to be 
a comparison between Army and Marine tank operations, many of the lessons learned by 
the Army are valuable in understanding the current and potential future use of the MlAl 
by the Marines. Furthermore, because the MlAls employed by the two services are very 
similar, Army historical information regarding vehicle performance will be invaluable. 
Finally, since most tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) initially taught to Marine 
tank leaders at the Army's Armor School are virtually identical to those taught to Army 
tank leaders, the Marines leave with a foundation of skills built on both Army and Marine 
TTPs. Once these Marines gain experience in Fleet Marine Force (FMF) tank units, the 
basic TTPs employed and operations conducted will be tailored in order to best support 
the MAGTF, creating a tank force which is operationally similar, but not identical, to the 
Army. These similar TTPs, operations, and vehicle capabilities make it valuable to 
incorporate the Army's tank employment literature and experiences into this thesis. 
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E. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This thesis will focus on the operations of tanks in support of the MAGTF. It will 
address operations currently assigned, operations previously executed, and potential future 
operations. It will also present an overview of the capabilities of the MlAl tank, 
including planned improvements. 
F. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II presents an overview on the historical employment of armor, Marine 
tank operations and Army tank operations. Chapter III discusses the current capabilities 
and specifications of the Marines' MlAI. Chapter IV discusses planned and potential 
future capabilities of the Marines' MlAI. Chapter V will then analyze the operations the 
Marines' MlAls could perform in support of the MAGTF, based on their current and 
future capabilities. Chapter VI will provide conclusions with recommendations regarding 
tank employment is support of the MAGTF. Appendix A includes pictures and drawings 
of the principle components of the MlAI discussed in Chapter III. Appendix B is a list of 
acronyms used throughout this thesis. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
While no study exists in Marine Corps' publications on the proper employment of 
the M1A1 tank within MAGTF operations, a variety of studies have been conducted 
which discuss various aspects of tank employment pertinent to the current capabilities of 
the M1Al. The purpose of the literature review is to familiarize the reader with 
publications on the historical theory of armor employment, Marine Corps tank 
employment, and U.S. Army tank employment. The historical theory will familiarize the 
reader with the early concept of armor warfare. Discussion on Marine Corps tank 
employment will focus on those studies which address specific tank employment methods 
as well as doctrine publications which incorporate the use of tanks by the Marines. Some 
studies examined consider the capabilities of the M1A1 while others do not. Those 
studies which do not consider the M1A1 are included because they are the most current 
versions of Marine tank employment publications. Army tank employment is introduced 
to provide the reader with a description of the Army's employment of the M1A1. 
B. IDSTORICAL THEORY OF ARMOR EMPLOYMENT 
The most widely recognized historical theory of armor employment, Armored 
Warfare, was written in 1927 by J. F. C. Fuller. This study argued that weapons systems 
should be used to accomplish one or more of five objectives: find, fix, hit, protect, and 
destroy. While Fuller noted that the most effective means of accomplishing all five 
objectives was through the use of combined arms, a method of employing all weapons on 
the battlefield in a synchronized effort, he argued that tanks could accomplish all five on a 
high-intensity battlefield. Fuller characterized the high-intensity battlefield as one where 
highly organized forces would fight under a combined arms organization equipped with 
the latest artillery, tanks, and rifles. He argued that the tank's mobility and firepower 
would enable the tank to find and fix the enemy. The tank's firepower and shock action 
would be used to hit and destroy the enemy. The tank's armor would protect the crew as . 
well as the friendly infantry following the tank, while the tank's firepower and shock action 
would destroy the enemy. [Ref 1 :p. 22-25] 
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Fuller further believed that tanks could fight in what is now referred to as 
low-intensity conflict (LIC). In his study on warfare in undeveloped and semi-civilized 
countries, Fuller categorized military operations into two groups: the maintenance oflaw 
and order and the crushing of revolt. In these operations, Fuller believed tank forces 
could successfully maintain the law using their mobility. This maintenance of the law 
could best be conducted by tanks because of their ability to maneuver from one zone of 
action to the next over extensive areas and all types of terrain. Fuller believed tanks could 
crush revolts using their mobility to quickly react to the revolt, combined with their 
application of firepower and shock effect against those creating the revolt. [Ref 1 :p. 
164-168] 
C. MARINE CORPS TANK EMPLOYMENT 
1. Fleet Marine Force Manual 9-1 
The use of firepower, shock action, armor protection, and mobility to describe the 
capabilities of tanks did not conclude with Armored Warfare. In 1981 the Marine Corps' 
Combat Development Command wrote the most current edition of Fleet Marine Force 
Manual (FMFM) 9-1, Tank Employment I Anti-mechanized Operations. This publication 
also addresses the capabilities of tanks in terms of their firepower, shock action, armor 
protection, and mobility. Tank Employment I Anti-mechanized Operations defines these 
terms as: 
•Armor-Protected Firepower: The armored vehicle is an integrated weapons 
system capable of defeating most targets on the battlefield. The armored 
vehicle gun is a high velocity, direct fire weapon used primarily against enemy 
tanks and hard targets. The amount of ammunition carried aboard the vehicle 
and the types available permit armored vehicles to engage a wide variety of 
targets for sustained periods of combat. Its armor affords protection to the 
components of the armored vehicle, including its crew, from the effects of 
small arms fire, shell fragments, and some direct hits, depending on the type 
and range of the assaulting weapon. Its armor also allows the armored vehicle 
to close with the enemy and maneuver while under enemy fire or friendly 
supporting fires with a degree of immunity that other weapons systems do not 
possess. This armor protection also provides a significant degree of protection 
against the effects of nuclear and chemical weapons. 
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•Mobility: Armored vehicle units are capable of conducting mobile ground 
combat over a broad area of operations. Armored vehicle units may remain 
dispersed to mass at a focal point of action at a decisive time. When properly 
utilized, the armored vehicles' mobility can increase the strength of a supported 
unit by applying their firepower against the enemy at several points within a 
short period of time. Armored vehicles, by virtue of their full track, possess a 
high degree of cross-country mobility. 
•Shock Power: The shock power of armored vehicles and mounted supporting 
troops causes a combined physical and psychological effect on the enemy. The 
shock power of armored vehicles is increased in proportion to the number of 
armored vehicles employed. Shock power, in a properly executed assault, has 
a devastating effect on enemy morale and a favorable effect on friendly morale. 
To exploit armored vehicle shock power, aggressive employment of the 
combat capability of combined arms teams is essential. [Ref 2:p. 1-2] 
These characteristics are addressed throughout FMFM 9-1, including the mission 
statement of Marine Corps tank units, "The basic task of Marine Corps tank units is to 
attack, disrupt, and destroy enemy forces through firepower, shock power, and maneuver 
in coordination with other arms" [Ref 2:p. 1-2]. 
Although FMFM 9-1 uses the term shock power instead ofFuller's shock action, 
and later publications use the term shock effect, the author believes the terms shock 
power, shock action, and shock effect all refer to the tank's physical capabilities which 
create psychological shock on the battlefield. This shock is generated by using the tanks 
ability to quickly close on the enemy, its ability to overrun defensive infantry positions, 
and its considerable size and noise as it approaches an enemy. These effects of shock 
usually contribute to a rapid destruction of the enemy's will to fight. 
7 
Unlike Fuller's principles of finding, fixing, hitting, protecting, and destroying, 
functions which could be conducted in all types of operations, FMFM 9-1 applies the 
capabilities of the tank to offensive, defensive, and special operations. The doctrine in 
FMFM 9-1 breaks tank offensive operations into six missions: 
•Movement to Contact 





Each of these missions is conducted capitalizing on the tank's firepower, armor-protection, 
shock power, and mobility to disrupt, disorganize and destroy the enemy. [Ref 2:p. 1-38] 
Defensive operations utilize the tank's firepower and mobility in a combined arms 
position defense, mobile defense or as the counterattack force. While FMFM 9-1 
considers the tank capable of performing any of these defensive operations, it continually 
emphasizes that the tank is primarily an offensive weapon and is best utilized when held in 
reserve and employed as the counterattack force where its mobility and armor protection 
can be best utilized. [Ref 2:p. 1-56] 
The employment of tanks in special operations is briefly discussed in FMFM 9-1, 
emphasizing the tank's ability to support the infantry in operations against irregular forces 
by isolating, surrounding, and destroying the enemy. Similar to operations against 
irregular forces, tanks should be employed in urban areas as a supporting arm to the 
infantry by providing direct fires and protection from counterattacks. [Ref 2:p. 1-74] 
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2. Operational Handbook 6-1 
A more recent Marine Corps publication, Operational Handbook (OH) 6-1, 
Ground Combat Operations, briefly describes the use of tanks in support of the MAGTF. 
This publication emphasizes the Marine Corps' current doctrine of maneuver warfare, 
which has ten principles: 
•Focus on the enemy; not on terrain objectives. 
• Act more quickly than the enemy can react. 
• Support maneuver by fire. 
• Issue mission type orders. 
• Avoid enemy strength and attack enemy weakness. 
•Exploit tactical opportunities developed or located by subordinate units. 
• Always designate a point of main effort. 
• Avoid set rules and patterns. 
• Act boldly and decisively. 
•Command from the front. [Ref 3:p. 1-5] 
Based on these principles of maneuver warfare, OH 6-1 describes the mission of Marine 
Corps tanks, "Tanks locate, close with, and destroy the enemy utilizing armor protected 
firepower, shock action, and maneuver" [Ref 3:p. 2-15]. 
Ground Combat Operations, similar to Tank Employment I Anti-mechanized 
Operations, breaks the roles of tanks into offensive and defensive operations. Offensive 
operations for tanks, according to OH 6-1, are: 
•General 
•Hasty Attack 
• Deliberate Attack 
•Movement to Contact 




Ground Combat Operations assigns these missions based on the tank's significant 
offensive firepower, mobility, and shock action. [Ref 3:p. 7-1] 
Defensive operations outlined in OH 6-1 are similar to those in FMFM 9-1 and 
also emphasize the offensive nature of tanks, stating that the defensive commander should 
employ tanks as the counterattack force to take advantage of their mobility and firepower. 
Other defensive operations OH 6-1 assigns to tanks are: 
•Defense against airborne and helicopter attack. 
•Defense against amphibious assault. 
•Defense against infiltration. 
•Reducing penetrations. 
•Defense of an urban area and defense at night. [Ref 3:p. 8-1] 
In addition to these offensive and defensive operations, OH 6-1 also discusses the 
use of tanks in support of security operations, counterinsurgency operations, and military 
operations short ofwar. Potential uses of tanks in security operations include performing 
as a screening, guarding, and covering force. Functions in counterinsurgency operations 
include strike operations, consolidation operations, fire support, patrolling, border control, 
and population allegiance. In military operations short of war, tanks may be used to 
conduct show of force operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, strike operations, 
military assistance to allies, and peacekeeping operations. [Ref 3:p. 14-1] 
3. Fleet Marine Force Manual 6 
The most recent Marine Corps publication which discusses Marine tank 
employment is FMFM 6, Ground Combat Operations, written in 1995. In FMFM 6 the 
principle of maneuver warfare is restated, "Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy 
that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and 
unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which 
the enemy cannot cope" [Ref 4:p. 1-2]. This version of Ground Combat Operations is 
significant because it was written after the Marine Corps procured the M1A1, and 
therefore, considers the capabilities of the M1A1 tank, which were not considered in 
FMFM 9-1 or OH 6-1. 
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FMFM 6, similar to previously discussed publications, addresses the capabilities of 
the tank in terms of firepower, armor protection, shock effect, and mobility: 
Tanks are the key element in creating shock effect for the Ground Combat 
Element (GCE). The firepower, armor protection, and mobility of tanks 
are well suited for exploiting breakthroughs and conducting counterattacks. 
They provide precision direct fires against enemy armor, fighting vehicles, 
and hardened positions. Combined with aviation forces and surface fire 
support, tanks and mechanized infantry provide the commander with a 
potent maneuver force capable of rapidly uncovering terrain and forcing 
the enemy to fight or displace. The mobility and range of tanks and vehicle 
mounted anti-armor guided missile systems allow their employment 
throughout the battlefield to include security operations. [Ref 4:p. 2-9] 
The principle missions of offensive and defensive operations, as well as Operations Other 
Than War (OOTW), prevail throughout FMFM 6. While FMFM 6 does not specifically 
address the employment of the M1A1, it does provide the reader with a description, 
although broad, of the capabilities of the M1A1. The description of the M1A1 in FMFM 
6 is broad because this publication is designed as a reference on the overall concept of 
ground combat operations, not tank specific operations. A current Marine Corps 
publication which specifically addresses the employment of the M1A1 has not been 
written, making it necessary to rely on the Army's current tank employment publications to 
best understand the operations the M1A1 is capable of conducting or supporting. 
D. ARMY TANK EMPLOYMENT 
The final publication dealing with the employment of tanks is the U.S. Army's Field 
Manual (FM) 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, written in 1988. 
Although this is an. Army doctrine publication, the reader must realize, as previously 
mentioned, that the M1A1 employed by the Army and Marine Corps are virtually 
identical in capabilities, and the tactics used by the Army are similar to those of Marine 
tank units. Additionally, even though this publication deals with the missions and 
employment of tanks as a Company Team rather than discussing these topics without 
regards to the size and structure of the unit, as previously discussed publications have, the 
document is worth reviewing because it considers the capabilities of the M1A1 in 
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developing appropriate tank operations. To understand the content ofFM 71-1, the 
reader must realize two things: first, the Company Team in the Army is the building block 
for commanders in structuring a force to best counter the enemy. Second, a Company 
Team may consist of fourteen M1A1 tanks or a combination of tanks and Bradley 
Fighting Vehicles. This publication identifies the capabilities of a tank Company Team as: 
•Capable of conducting operations requiring a high degree of firepower, 
mobility, armor protection, and shock effect. 
•Capable of destroying enemy armor at long and close ranges. 
•Capable of destroying mounted and dismounted infantry. 
•Capable of conducting continuous operations under most terrain and weather 
conditions. [Ref 5 :p. 1-7] 
Field Manual 71-1 considers the M1A1's advanced fire control system, armor 
package and weapons systems in developing the above capabilities. Field Manual 71-1 
follows suit with previously discussed publications in characterizing tanks in terms of 
firepower, mobility, armor protection, and shock effect. These capabilities are also 
applied in terms of offensive and defensive operations, as well as other tactical operations. 
Offensive operations assigned to tanks in FM 71-1 include movement to contact, hasty 
attack, deliberate attack, exploitation, and pursuit [Ref 5:p.3-1]. Defensive operations 
include destruction of enemy forces, defeating an enemy attack, gaining time, 
concentrating forces elsewhere, controlling key or decisive terrain, wearing down enemy 
forces prior to offensive operations, and retaining strategic, operational or tactical 
objectives [Ref 5 :p. 4-1]. Other tactical operations assigned to tanks include relief in 
place, passage of lines, delay, withdrawal, hasty water or gap crossing, and Military 
Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) [Ref 5:p. 5-1]. 
The difference between FM 71-1 and previously mentioned Marine Corps 
publications is the doctrine the Army employs. Unlike the Marine Corps application of 
maneuver warfare, the Army fights using the concept of the Air Land battle. This doctrine 
emphasizes the Army's ability to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations on land 
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with forces capable of defeating the enemy, and seizing, occupying and defending land 
areas. Whereas the Marine Corps may employ the M1A1 utilizing maneuver warfare to 
destroy the enemy without the objective of occupying and defending land areas for 
prolonged periods of time. [Ref 5:p. 1-1] 
E. CONCLUSION 
Each of the publications discussed emphasize the tank's capabilities based on armor 
protection, shock effect, firepower, and mobility. Armored Warfare is an excellent 
reference for the basic principles of armor employment. Tank Employment I 
Anti-mechanized Operations is the most detailed document on the employment of tanks in 
the Marine Corps. However, since it was written when the Marines were using the 
M60A1 tank and not the current M1A1, it fails to accurately address the employment of 
tanks based on the capabilities of the M1A1. Both versions of Ground Combat 
Operations, OH 6-1 and FMFM 6, discuss tank employment only in broad terms and are 
not designed for use as a reference document for the employment of tanks. Rather, these 
publications should be used to understand the overall scheme ofMarine Corps ground 
combat operations. 
While Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team was written to best describe 
the employment of the M1A1 tank, because it is an Army doctrine publication, the concept 
of employment under the Army's Air Land battle is somewhat different than the 
employment techniques of the Marines utilizing maneuver warfare. Since the Marine 
Corps has not revised FMFM 9-1 and other current publications are not specific to M1A1 
tank employment in the Marine Corps, a need exists to articulate the capabilities of the 
Marines' M1A1 tank and tie these capabilities to the operations these tanks could perform 




ill. CURRENT TANK CAPABILITIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the current capabilities of the MlAl tank used by the 
Marine Corps today. This information may be apparent to those readers familiar with the 
MlAl, it is provided for those not familiar with this tank and as a quick reference in 
understanding the MlAl's capabilities. The MlAl is an improved version of the Ml 
Abrams main battle tank. It was developed under a joint venture between the U.S. Army 
and Marine Corps as a replacement for the M60 series tank. In designing the Ml, the 
Army and Marine Corps stressed the importance of crew survivability, lethality and 
mobility. The final product and its improved versions, including the MlAl, provide the 
necessary survivability, lethality and mobility to address threat weapons systems of the 
current period and into the twenty-first century. The primary threat vehicles the Ml was 
designed to defeat include the latest versions of the Soviet made T -series tanks, including 
the T-72, T-80 and T-90. The MlAl's capabilities will now be discussed in terms ofthe 
four characteristics introduced in the literature review: armor protection, mobility, 
firepower, and shock effect. 
B. ARMOR PROTECTION 
1. Vehicle Survivability 
The MlAl employed by the Marines provides protection to its crew through the 
most substantial armor package ever applied to a U.S. tank. While most specifics on the 
armor is classified and will not be discussed here, the general characteristics of this armor 
are unclassified. The armor is made of steel encased depleted uranium, a substance two 
and a half times the density of homogeneous steel. The armor is concentrated around the 
tank's frontal sixty degrees, affording the tank crew the most protection in this area. This 
armor proved to be effective against Soviet built T -72 tanks during Operation Desert 
Storm in Southwest Asia. During the ground war seven different U.S. Army MlAls with 
depleted uranium armor were engaged and hit by Iraqi T-72 tank rounds. These MlAls 
sustained no substantial vehicle damage or injury to the tank crew. [Ref 6:p. 138] 
15 
In addition to the direct fire protection afforded to the crew by this armor, the 
crew is also protected against Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) over the frontal sixty 
degrees as well. Protection from small arms fire and fragmentation is provided around the 
entire vehicle. While primary protection against ATGMs is provided by the vehicle's 
armor, a missile countermeasure device is also used as a deterrent against ATGMs. 
A smoke generation system, which sprays fuel over the exhaust manifold, provides 
an onboard smoke screening capability for use as an obscurant in both offensive and 
defensive operations. [Ref 6:p. 142] 
The immunity to small arms fire and fragmentation enables the tank to close 
against the enemy under both direct and indirect fire. This immunity to small arms fire 
was demonstrated in 1993 when Marine M1A1s employed during Operation Restore 
Hope in Somalia were routinely engaged by small arms fire without damage to the vehicle 
or injury to the crew. [Ref 9:p. 1] This armor protection also allows the MlAl to close 
on an objective under fire by friendly artillery and air, a practice routinely employed by the 
Marines using the concept of combined arms warfare. 
2. Crew Survivability 
The M1A1 was designed to afford the crew protection against not only threat 
weapon systems of the current and future period, but also against hazards inherent in the 
operation of an armored vehicle. This protection comes in the form of 
compartmentalization of explosive materials including ammunition and fuel. Ammunition 
is stored in an armor compartment accessed by the crew through hydraulic armor doors. 
If the ammunition compartment is hit by fire, blow-off panels on the turret roof direct the 
explosion away from the tank crew. An automatic fire sensing and suppression system 
further protects the crew against onboard fires. An over-pressure system, using bleed off 
air from the turbine engine routed through a system of filters, allows the tank to operate in 
all Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) environments. This NBC protection is 
further enhanced by an automatic detection device and onboard decontamination kits. 
[Ref 7:p. 3-128] 
This complement of armor and crew protection devices provides the tank crew 
with a significant degree of protection against current and future threat weapons systems. 
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C. MOBILITY 
1. General Description 
Tracked vehicles such as the tank have always had a considerable advantage in 
battlefield mobility over their wheeled counterparts because of their full track. In 
designing the M1A1, the Army and Marine Corps wanted a vehicle capable of 
maneuvering on all types of battlefields, including desert, jungle, mountain and urban 
terrain. The M1Al's suspension uses a series oftorsion bars, rotary shock absorbers and 
road wheels to accommodate the significant weight of the vehicle while maintaining a 
stable platform for the crew. To improve the M1Al's mobility over the aging M60 tank, 
the MlA1 was built with a gas turbine engine. \Vhile several factors were taken into 
account before selecting a turbine engine instead of a diesel, including reliability and 
maintainability, the overriding factor was the better acceleration and top-end speed of the 
turbine over a diesel engine. The turbine engine allows the M1Al to quickly maneuver 
from one battle position to the next, a concept considered critical in a position defense 
against an enemy with a significantly larger number of tanks. 
2. Mobility Specifications 
The M1A1 has a cruising range of 289 miles without refueling. The tank's 
maximum speed while governed is 42 miles per hour on a flat level surface and 30 miles 
per hour on cross country terrain. The tank is governed by a Digital Electronic Control 
Unit (DECU) which controls fuel flow to maximize fuel efficiency. By governing the 
speed of the vehicle, allowing the crew to operate the M1A1 no faster than 42 mph, the 
DECU also minimizes wear and tear on the suspension. Ungoverned speeds are 
significantly faster, but only used during war. The ungoverned speed and cruising range of 
the M1A1 were demonstrated during Operation Desert Storm when the Army's Seventh 
Corps traveled over 120 miles in twenty-four hours, fighting along the way, in an effort to 
stop the Iraqi Republican Guard equipped with T -72s. The decision to use the Army's 
M1A1s during this confrontation instead of the Marine M60A1s was based partially on the 
M1Al's superior cross-country mobility and firepower. [Ref 6:p. 138] 
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In addition to the M1A1 s impressive cross country mobility, it is capable of 
overcoming a variety of obstacles. The tank is capable of crossing a trench as wide as 
nine feet, providing it with the capability of crossing most hastily constructed tank 
trenches. Vertical obstacles as high as forty-two inches can be climbed, a height today's 
wheeled vehicles will not overcome. The M1A1 will climb a slope ofup to sixty degrees. 
With the addition of a mine clearing blade, the tank is capable of clearing surface and 
buried mines up to six feet in front of it. This breaching can be conducted without the aid 
of supporting forces or in conjunction with engineer forces where obstacles such as large 
tank ditches or wire exist. [Ref 10:p. 1] 
The M1A1 is also capable of overcoming natural obstacles such as water. Without 
fording equipment, the M1A1 is capable of operating in water up to forty-eight inches in 
depth. With the use of the Deep Water Fording Kit (DWFK), an equipment upgrade 
designed for use by the Marines, the tank will ford water as deep as seventy-eight inches. 
The DWFK was designed for the Marine Corps for use when off-loading the tank from 
U.S. Navy ship-to-shore craft during amphibious operations. [Ref 6:p. 141] 
3. Power Train Specifications 
The gas turbine is a multi-fuel engine capable of burning diesel, jet fuel and petrol. 
The engine generates 1500 horsepower at 3000 Revolutions Per Minute (RPM), creating 
a power-to-weight ratio of27 Horsepower per Ton (HP/T), allowing it to accelerate from 
zero to twenty miles per hour in 6.8 seconds. The turbine is coupled to an automatic 
transmission with four forward and two reverse gears as well as an internal 
hydromechanical braking system. A twenty-four volt generator running off the turbine 
provides electrical power throughout the vehicle. 
In order to conserve fuel and minimize noise and thermal signature, an External 
Auxiliary Power Unit (EAPU) can be used when operating in defensive positions. The 
EAPU is a small diesel generator located in the bustle rack which generates enough power 
to operate the communications and fire control systems as well as charge the vehicle's 
batteries. 
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4. Communication System Specifications 
The M1A1 is equipped with a suite of communication equipment. Two Single 
Channel Ground and Airborne Radios (SINCGARS), standard Very High Frequency 
(VHF) radios in use throughout the Army and Marine Corps, are in each tank. The two 
radios allow the crew to monitor up to fourteen encrypted radio nets in single channel 
mode or two in frequency hopping mode. High-power amplifiers enable the crew to 
communicate to supported and supporting agencies over great distances. This 
communication capability is used extensively in dispersing and massing tank forces at the 
appropriate time so that the utility of the M1A1 is maximized. A Position Location and 
Reference System (PLRS) is also carried on each tank. This system allows the tank crew 
to accurately determine the position of their vehicle as well as that of other PLRS 




The M1A1 's fire control system was designed to provide the tank crew with the 
most lethal tank on the battlefield. The result is a system capable of engaging long range 
targets from stationary positions or while on-the-move under most battlefield conditions. 
The weapon systems are compatible with North Atlantic Treaty Organization {NATO) 
standard ammunition and are capable of addressing the majority of conventional threat 
weapons systems, such as tanks, personnel carriers, helicopters, artillery, and 
reconnaissance vehicles on the current and future battlefield. 
2. Main Gun Specifications 
The tank main gun is a 120mm smoothbore cannon currently capable of firing two 
types of ammunition. The main gun can be traversed and fired around the full 3 60 degrees 
of the vehicle and elevated from -10 to +20 degrees. An armor piercing, fin stabilized, 
discarding sabot round is fired against heavy armor such as tanks and armored personnel 
carriers. This kinetic energy round has a maximum effective range of 2500 meters. While 
engagements beyond the maximum effective range of the round do not have as high a 
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probability of killing the target and are less accurate, engagements during Operation 
Desert Storm proved successful out to 4000 meters. The second main gun round, the 
High Explosive Anti-tank (HEAT) round, is a chemical energy round for use against 
hardened targets, such as bunkers, as well as lightly armored vehicles, including trucks and 
personnel carriers. The HEAT round has a maximum effective range of 2100 meters. A 
combination of forty SABOT and HEAT rounds are carried on each tank, thirty-four in a 
readily accessible compartment behind the crew in the turret and six in a hull storage area. 
[Ref 8:p. 2] 
3. Machine Gun Specifications 
The M1A1 mounts three machine guns, two 7.62mm M240s and one 12.7mm (.50 
caliber) M2. One M240 is mounted coaxially to the tank's main gun, is elevated and 
traversed on the same axis, and is controlled by the fire control system. The second M240 
is mounted in the loader's position for use against troops, lightly armored vehicles, and 
aircraft. The loader's M240 can be elevated from -30 to +65 degrees. A total of 11,400 
rounds of7.62mm ammunition is carried in each tank. Both M240s are interchangeable, 
allowing the crew to replace the coaxially mounted machine gun with the loader's M240 if 
a malfunction occurs. The M240 has a maximum effective range of 900 meters. 
The 12. 7mm M2 is mounted at the commander's weapon station. This machine 
gun can be fired while the vehicle hatches are closed utilizing controls at the commander's 
station, which include a three power sight, or from outside the vehicle using the weapons 
trigger and iron sights. The M2 can be elevated from -10 to +65 degrees. The 
commander's weapon station is capable oftraversing the full360 degrees ofthe vehicle for 
use against lightly armored vehicles, troops, and aircraft. The M2 mount is designed to 
accommodate the M240 if a malfunction occurs with the M2. A total of 1000 rounds of 
12. 7mm ammunition is carried in each tank. [Ref 6:p. 139] 
4. Fire Control Specifications 
The fire control system is designed to provide target sighting, ranging, aiming and 
firing ofboth the main gun and the 7.62mm coaxial machine gun. The system uses a 
combination ofboth automatic and manual inputs to create a digital ballistic firing solution 
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for both main and machine gun rounds. Automatic inputs include vehicle cant, cross wind, 
lead, and range. Manual inputs include air temperature, barometric pressure, and 
ammunition temperature. Air temperature and barometric pressure are obtained from 
intelligence reports. Ammunition temperature is considered to be the same as that in the 
ammunition compartment which is measured by an onboard thermostat located at the 
gunner's position. 
Two sights are tied into the fire control system. One is an optical sight for use 
during periods of good visibility. The second sight is a thermal Forward Looking Infrared 
(FLIR) sight for visibility during night or periods oflow visibility, including smoke and 
battlefield obscuration. Both sights have three and ten power magnification capabilities 
for wide and narrow fields of view. The laser range finder allows the crew to quickly 
determine the range to a target. Other elements of the fire control system include 
elevation and azimuth stabilization systems enabling the tank crew to engage targets from 
stationary positions or while on-the-move at all angles of attack. 
An extension of the gunner's sight and override system allow the tank commander 
to fire the main gun and coaxial machine gun from the commander's position. This 
capability allows the tank to be operated using a three man crew, if required. 
A secondary fire control system is also present, using an eight power sight and 
mechanical and electrical firing devices in the event the primary fire control system 
malfunctions or is damaged. 
5. Other Firepower Assets 
In addition to the tank's main gun and machine guns, each crew member carries a 
9mm pistol. One 5.56mm rifle is also carried for crew protection when dismounted. A 
total of 120 9mm rounds and 180 5.56mm rounds is typically carried on each tank. A 
combination of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, grenades, and concertina wire is also 
carried based upon the tactical situation. Two smoke grenade launchers mounted on the 
turret's sides fire red phosphorous grenades for obscuration against ATGMs. 
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E. SHOCK EFFECT 
The shock effect of the MlAl is not attributed to any one capability of the vehicle, 
rather it is developed through the tank crew's use of its weapons systems, maneuverability, 
and armor when closing against an enemy. The MlAl's ability to quickly accelerate and 
travel across all types of terrain allows it to maneuver against and into the enemy. Its 
ability to engage all types of targets while on the move under the full spectrum of weather 
conditions and visibility further enhance its shock effect. Finally, the vehicle's armor 
protection allows the crew to literally run over the enemy without fear of damaging the 
vehicle or injuring the crew. These cumulative capabilities all contribute to the tank's 
ability to demoralize an enemy incapable of stopping this vehicle as it closes on their 
position, creating overwhelming shock effect. 
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F. SUMMARY OF CURRENT CAPABILITIES 
The M1A1 currently employed by the Marines is a lethal, maneuverable, and 
survivable weapon system which can provide a significant amount of combat power to the 
MAGTF. These capabilities are summarized in the following table for quick reference. 
Chapter IV will address planned improvements to the Marines' M1A1 which will further 
improve the combat power available to the MAGTF. 
Weight 67.7 tons (Combat loaded) 
Length 385 inches 
Width 144 inches 
Height 114 inches (without DWFK) 
Ground clearance 19 inches 
Fuel Capacity 495 gals (useable) 
Cruising range 289 miles 
Horsepower 1500 at 3000 rpm 
Power-to-weight ratio 27 hp/ton 
Maximum Speed 42 mph (30 mph cross country) 
Acceleration 0-20 mph in 6.8 seconds 
For ding depth 48 inches (78 inches with 
DWFK) 
Vertical crossing 42 inches 
Trench crossing 9 feet 
Slope climb 60 degrees 
Main gun M256 smoothbore cannon 
Commander's weapon M2 12.7mm (.50 caliber) 
machine gun 
Loader's weapon M240 7.62mm machine _gun 
Coaxial weapon M240 7.62mm machine gun 
Fire control Digital ballistic computer with 
automatic and manual inputs 
Sights Day and night (thermal) in 3 or 
10 power 
Armor Steel encased depleted uranium 
Table 1. Current tank capabilities and specifications. 
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IV. FUTURE TANK CAPABILITIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the planned and potential future capabilities of the MIAI 
tank employed by the Marine Corps. Planned improvements include those modifications 
which have been funded and are scheduled to be implemented. Potential improvements 
include modifications which are currently under consideration for funding and 
implementation. 
Similar to most weapons systems, the Abrams tank continues to be improved as 
technology advances and the threat changes. The MIA2 is the follow-on to the MIAI. 
The primary difference between the MIAI and the MIA2 is the addition of an intra and 
inter-vehicle information system. The inter-vehicle information system allows the tank 
crew to communicate digitally across the battlefield. The intra-vehicular information 
system allows the crew to more accurately monitor and diagnose their tank through an 
onboard computer which monitors the automotive and fire control components of the 
tank. 
The second difference between the MIAI and MIA2 is the addition of a second 
sight for the main gun, enabling the tank commander to search one sector while the gunner 
searches another. 
While the Army is currently upgrading their Ml tanks into the MIA2 
configuration, modifications which will improve the vehicle's firepower, mobility, and 
reliability, the Marine Corps, because oflimited fiscal resources, has chosen to improve 
their MIAI through selected modifications. While these modifications do not include all 
upgrades used in converting an MIAI to an MIA2, those which the Marine Corps 
considers most effective and affordable are either planned or have the potential to be 
implemented on the Marines' MIAI. 
Some modifications result from lessons learned during training and combat, while 
others focus on improving the tank with advanced technology. The goal with all 
modifications is to continually improve the tank U.S. forces employ around the world. 
Planned modifications will be introduced first, followed by potential modifications. 
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B. IMPROVED MOBILITY AND RELIABILITY 
One of the MIAI 's vulnerabilities, discovered during training as well as Operation 
Desert Storm, is the turbine engine•s requirement for clean air. During training at both 
Army and Marine Corps desert training centers, the turbine engine•s air filtration system 
quickly became clogged by dust, sand, and rocks. To clean the filtration system filters, the 
vehicle must be stopped, the filters removed, and thoroughly cleaned by crewmen. This 
cleaning must occur after every twenty-four hours of operation and takes one to two 
hours to complete. When the filters are not frequently cleaned, foreign object damage 
(POD) may occur to the turbine engine, resulting in degraded performance and shorter 
engine life. 
During Operation Desert Storm the Army replaced these filters rather than 
stopping, removing, cleaning and reinstalling the filters. Obviously, if a tank crew must 
stop and clean these filters or operate their vehicle in a degraded mode, the mission is 
subject to failure. To solve this problem, an initiative was begun shortly after Desert 
Storm to procure the Pulse Jet Air System (PJAS), which can clean these filters without 
having to remove them or stop the vehicle. This system monitors the filters for air 
flow-through. Once the flow level decreases to a point which could degrade the engine•s 
performance, an automatic system using jet air from the engine blows the sand, dust, or 
dirt out of the filters. Because the system is automatic, the vehicle does not have to stop 
in the middle of operations. 
The MIAI•s capabilities are improved with this system in several ways. First, 
PJAS will improve the reliability of the engine. Since the filters are constantly monitored 
and cleaned, the engine will be less likely to shut down due to FOD. This is a critical 
capability if the tank is closing on an objective and the engine suddenly shuts down due to 
clogged filters. With PJAS this vulnerability is significantly minimized. Second, PJAS 
improves the mobility of the MIAI because it ensures the engine will operate at peak 
performance. 
Third, PJAS will reduce the cost of repairing or replacing the turbine engine. In 
March, 1996, the Army Tank Automotive and Armaments Command conducted a 
cost-benefit analysis ofPJAS for the Marine Corps. The results showed that PJAS will 
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save $30,430 per vehicle per year in repair and replacement costs [Ref 10:p. 19]. The 
Marine Corps is currently modifying its M1A1s with PJAS with scheduled completion in 
Fiscal Year (FY) 1998. 
C. IMPROVED NIGHT VISION CAPABILITY 
During operations at night or periods oflimited visibility, the driver on the M1A1 
uses a passive night sight. This sight magnifies the ambient light in a manner similar to 
current night vision goggles. While this sight is successful in aiding the driver during 
limited visibility, it is dependent on the amount of ambient light. The presence of 
obscuration such as smoke or fog severely degrades this passive device. To improve the 
driver's ability to see during limited visibility, the Marine Corps plans to modify all combat 
vehicles, including the M1A1, with a thermal viewer for the driver. 
This Driver's Thermal Viewer (DTV), the ANN AS-5 DVE, is a second generation 
Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) system with significant advantages over the current 
ANNVS-2 passive device. First of all, it will allow the driver to see through obscurants 
such as dust, fog, rain, snow, and smoke during both day and night operations. Secondly, 
it will allow the driver to see when no ambient light is present due to cloud or tree cover. 
Finally, it will allow the driver to see on a battlefield where gun fire, flares, or fire are 
present. This capability to see through obscurants common on a battlefield will allow the 
crew to better utilize the tank in a combat situation. Better vision at night will ensure the 
driver maneuvers the tank along the desired route, keeping the tank on course in support 
of its mission. 
Tests conducted by the Army's Night Vision Lab (NVL) after Desert Storm 
showed that the ANN AS-5 DVE significantly improved the driver's ability to see through 
dust, smoke, and fog. Additionally, driving during both day and night, and in areas where 
flashes and fires were present, was easier using the new system rather than the current 
passive device. Finally, tests showed that a stationary target can be detected using the 
DVE out to 1200 meters, a moving target out to 2000 meters. This is a capability the 
current passive device does not offer. [Ref 12:p. 14] 
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Since the Marine Corps is planning to modify all armored vehicles with the Driver's 
Thermal Viewer, this is an improved capability for not only the Marines' tanks, but all 
combat vehicles. Modification is scheduled to being in FY 98. 
D. IMPROVED LETHALITY 
1. Overview 
To keep pace with developing technologies and improvements to threat weapon 
systems, the Marine Corps is considering several modifications to the M1A1 to improve 
its lethality. There are two methods for improving the lethality of the M1A1: 1) field 
improved munitions with more lethality than ammunition currently in use, and 2) modify 
the fire control system to improve the accuracy of the ammunition employed. The Marine 
Corps is in the process of fielding advanced munitions and is considering technological 
improvements to the MlAl 's fire control system. 
2. Ammunition Improvements 
Three main gun rounds are currently being fielded or in development for use with 
the MlAl 's 120mm main gun. The Marine Corps recently modified the fire control 
system on their MlAls in anticipation of fielding two of these rounds. The first, which is 
already fielded, is the M830Al HEAT -MP-T or MP AT round. The MP AT round is a 
high explosive multipurpose round with an anti-helicopter defeat capability. A manually 
operated proximity switch allows the tank crewman to choose either ground or air mode 
for the round. In the ground mode the MP AT is similar in characteristics and capabilities 
to the current HEAT round. In this mode it is designed to defeat light armored vehicles, 
buildings, bunkers, and Anti-tank Guided Missile (ATGM) platforms. When the round is 
fired in air mode, a proximity fuse senses when the round is within seven meters of a large 
metal object such as a helicopter. When the proximity fuse senses the helicopter, the 
round explodes, scattering shrapnel in the vicinity of the targeted helicopter. [Ref 13:p. 1] 
With the fielding of the MP AT round, the tank is now capable of defeating attack 
helicopters, a threat the MIAI was previously incapable of addressing. This capability 
significantly improves both the lethality and survivability of the tank. Range of the MP AT 
in both modes is classified. 
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The second round the MlAl's fire control system has been modified to fire is the 
Smart Target Activated Fire and Forget (STAFF) round. This is the first smart munition 
designed for use by Army and Marine MlAls. The STAFF round uses a dual millimeter 
wave radar, microprocessor control and an Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP). The 
radar scans the line of flight for targets and utilizes onboard software to discriminate 
potential targets from battlefield clutter and countermeasures. Once a target is found, the 
electronic brain rolls the warhead down to the target. The EFP, once aligned with the 
target, is fired upon impact on top of the target. The capability to attack the top of a 
target is significant since most armored vehicles are more vulnerable on their top and 
bottom than their front and sides. This round also provides the capability to destroy 
targets not in the line of sight. Once the general vicinity of a target is identified, via 
intelligence or airborne reconnaissance, the round is fired in the targets general vicinity 
with the onboard guidance system directing the round towards the target. 
The range, terminal effects, and current fielding status of the STAFF round are 
classified. The capabilities, as described, will significantly improve the lethality of the 
MlAl. Since the STAFF round is a fire and forget round, it not only improves the tanks 
ability to engage targets on the battlefield, it enables the tank to fire the round and 
immediately maneuver to another position, reducing the likelihood of becoming detected. 
The third round under development is the X-ROD. This round uses a depleted 
uranium long-rod penetrator, similar to the current SABOT round. The X-ROD, unlike 
the SABOT round, is a smart munition. The round uses a millimeter wave sensor which 
compares the electronic signature of the intended target with those in its memory to 
confirm the target as viable. The sensor guides the round to the target, making minor 
corrections to allow for slight deviations that can occur when fired at moving targets or 
targets several kilometers away. When the sensor determines the round is a kilometer 
away from the target, it ignites a rocket motor to increase the round's velocity as it closes 
on the target. The tremendous velocity provided by the rocket motor and accuracy 
provided by the onboard sensor will enable the tank to engage targets at greater ranges 
with a higher probability than current rounds. The X-ROD is currently in 
proof-of-principle testing. Actual range and terminal effects are classified. [Ref 14:p. 23] 
29 
3. Fire Control System Improvements 
To improve the target detection and accuracy of the M1A1, the Marine Corps is 
considering two improvements to the current fire control system. The first is the 
replacement of the current thermal sight with a second generation thermal sight. The 
current thermal sight is a first generation analog FLIR with three and ten power 
magnification capability. Advantages of the second generation FLIR over the current 
system include digital output, built-in stabilization, improved poor weather capability, 
twenty power magnification, better resolution, and better reliability and maintainability. 
[Ref. 15:p. 2] 
In conjunction with replacing the thermal sight with the second generation sight is 
the anticipated replacement of the current laser range finder with a Multi-Function Laser 
System (MFLS). The current laser range finder is a non-eye safe laser capable of 
determining ranges of targets out to 7990 meters. The MFLS will provide the gunner 
with the capability to determine the target range out to 10,000 meters. This range finder 
operates at a higher repetition rate with narrower beam divergence for higher accuracy 
during operations in smoke, dust, and fog. 
The second function of the "MFLS is designating targets for smart munitions. In 
this role the laser is capable of transmitting a continuous beam which is coded to interface 
with laser guided munitions launched from aircraft. The "MFLS is capable of designating 
targets out to 6000 meters. 
The third function of the MFLS is for use in identifying targets as friend or foe. In 
the target profiler mode, the MFLS transmits pulses of light to the target, interprets the 
shape of the target based upon the returned light, and determines what the target is using 
an Aid Target Recognition (ATR) processor. The ATR determines the vehicle type by 
comparing the returned light against a database containing values of returned light 
associated with particular vehicles. The processor then displays the name of the vehicle in 
the gunner's and commander's sights. The commander or gunner makes the final 
determination on whether the vehicle is friend or foe, based on their knowledge of friendly 
and enemy vehicles operating in the area. In this mode the MFLS will profile targets out 
to 5000 meters. [Ref. 15:p. 10-12] 
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Through the replacement of the current thermal sight and laser range finder, the 
lethality and utility of the MIAI will improve significantly. The new thermal sight will 
allow the tank crew to see further under all battlefield conditions, allowing them to engage 
targets at greater distances with better accuracy. The MFLS will provide accurate ranges 
to targets in all battlefield conditions, enable the tank to designate for smart munitions, and 
assist the crew in identifying targets before becoming engaged. 
E. POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS 
The improvements discussed are those which the Marine Corps considers to be the 
most feasible modifications to their MIAI s. Since technology and threat weapon systems 
will continue to improve, the Marine Corps must continue to modify their MlAls to 
counter future threat systems. Several modifications have been proposed by the tank 
community which have the potential to be implemented as technology develops and fiscal 
resources become available. These improvements include a main gun smoke round, an 
automatic boresighting system for the fire control system, and the conversion of the 
analog computer system to a digital system similar to that found on the MIA2. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The planned and potential improvements to the Marines' MlAls will enhance their 
capabilities through improved lethality, mobility, and reliability. These additional 






This chapter analyzes the operations the Marine Corps' MIAI tanks could perform 
in support ofMAGTF operations. The following operations are analyzed in this chapter: 
offensive operations, defensive operations, other tactical operations, Operations Other 
Than War (OOTW), and emerging operations. In these operations, tanks can perform one 
or more of the following missions: as an infantry support force, as an anti-armor force, or 
as a maneuver force. 
The analysis is based on the capabilities now and in the future of the MIAI, as 
described in Chapters III and IV. Lessons learned from both training and combat 
operations involving the MIAI, as well as conclusions from the 1996 Armor Conference, 
are included to support this analysis. While not every operation the MAGTF may conduct 
is included in this analysis, those which are most likely to benefit from the employment of 
the MIAI are presented. 
B. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 
1. Overview 
Offensive operations are designed to destroy the enemy, rather than seize terrain or 
strong points. During offensive operations, the force must possess sufficient firepower, 
maneuverability, lethality, flexibility, and protection to engage and destroy the enemy on a 
fluid battlefield. The offensive force must utilize their maneuverability and speed to 
surprise the enemy, attack the enemy's support structure, and disrupt his organization. 
The offensive force must also be capable of massing and dispersing its elements at the 
decisive time and place. 
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2. Movement To Contact 
Movement to contact is conducted to establish or regain contact with the enemy. 
Once contact is made with the enemy, the force must be capable of rapidly maneuvering 
against the enemy to hit the weakest areas. The MlAl tank is well suited to participate in 
a movement to contact. Its ability to maneuver over all types of terrain in most weather 
conditions allows the tank crew to rapidly hit the enemy's vulnerable areas. During the 
initial contact, the MlAl 's firepower, specifically the long range of its main gun and high 
powered sights, will allow the tank crew to engage and destroy the lead elements of the 
enemy before the enemy is capable of reacting to the tank's fire. This early destruction of 
the enemy's leading forces will limit the enemy's intelligence gathering capability and force 
him to fight without the aid of an accurate picture of the battlefield. 
The communication package in the MlAl will further facilitate conduct of the 
operation through coordination of artillery and air against the encountered enemy. This 
coordination of arms is essential in a mechanized battle where the enemy may possess a 
larger number and variety of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery. To counter 
this threat, the MAGTF coordinates artillery and aircraft through its lead element, typically 
tank forces. The tank force is capable of rapidly coordinating MAGTF air and artillery 
assets against the enemy. The MlAl's powerful suite of communication equipment 
enables the tank crew to communicate to all MAGTF assets up to 50 kilometers away. 
Additional communication equipment, such as High Frequency (HF) and Ultra High 
Frequency (UHF) radios, are frequently added to the MlAl's standard communication 
equipment to further enhance the tank force's ability to coordinate MAGTF fires on the 
enemy. 
This communication suite will also facilitate rapid dissemination of intelligence 
gathered by the tank forces and deployment of the force in the most appropriate manner. 
The MAGTF commander's ability to know the battlefield and position forces is improved 
when the MlAl's long range communication capability is employed to relay battlefield 
intelligence to subordinate and supporting forces of the MAGTF. 
The armor protection and survivability features of the MlAl further enhance its 
ability to conduct a movement to contact. The armor will provide a degree of protection 
34 
for the crew against fire from the lead elements of the enemy, allowing it to operate 
against most conventional forces. The tank's thermal sights will allow the crew to engage 
the enemy through battlefield obscuration, such as smoke, which the enemy may employ in 
an effort to break contact. If tanks are employed as the lead element in the movement to 
contact, their smoke generating capability can be used to cover the movement of 
follow-on forces as they maneuver to hit the enemy in the flank or rear. 
The capability oftoday's tank force to conduct a movement to contact with the 
MIAI is superior to prior Marine tank forces employing the M60Al. The M60Al was 
less maneuverable over cross country terrain, had a maximum cross country speed of only 
17 mph, had significantly less armor protection, and was unable to operate on an obscured 
battlefield because it did not have a thermal sight. 
3. Attack 
An attack may occur if the enemy location is known or after contact has been 
made. Attacks require a great deal of firepower, mobility, protection, and flexibility. The 
most successful attack is performed by a combined arms team, utilizing infantry, artillery, 
armor, and air assets. The MIAI is well suited to conduct attacks as part of a combined 
arms team. The range, cross country mobility, and speed of the MIAI allows the 
MAGTF to rapidly cover terrain as they engage the enemy. 
Once in the attack, the MIAI can be employed in several manners. One method of 
employing tanks in the attack is attack by fire. In this method, the tank closes, firing as it 
moves, to destroy the enemy. As the enemy is destroyed, the tank force continues to 
move, allowing follow-on forces to clear the enemy from the objective. This capability to 
fire while on-the-move did not exist with the M60Al. Since the MIAI can fire 
on-the-move, attack speed is increased, improving the MAGTF's element of surprise, 
while minimizing the amount of time the enemy has to react. The MIAI's accurate fire 
control system, lethal main gun, and ability to operate under most weather and battlefield 
conditions further enhance the MIAI's ability to conduct a more rapid and destructive 
attack than tank forces employing the M60Al. 
The second form of attack is the assault. The assault is conducted when the enemy 
is capable of surviving an attack by fire. This may occur if the enemy possesses tanks or 
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fortified positions which are not destroyed by the tank's long range main gun fire or 
artillery and aircraft fires coordinated at the beginning of the attack. This form of attack 
requires the mobility and firepower of an attack by fire operation as well as armor 
protection for crew and vehicle survivability. The assault requires the force to fire on the 
enemy as it closes on and into the objective. The MIAI is excellent for use in the assault. 
Its firepower and mobility allow the crew to quickly close on the enemy while engaging 
him. The armor package affords the crew protection from enemy fire as the tank closes 
on the enemy. As the tank moves onto the objective, the enemy will be subject to the 
shock effect created by the size and speed of the tank as it literally runs over their position. 
This shock effect will force the enemy to either fight in place or surrender. 
The third type of attack the MIAI can perform is support by fire. This type of 
attack utilizes the tank's main gun to destroy enemy vehicles at long range and the tank's 
machine guns for suppressive fire as a second force assaults the objective. In situations 
where the enemy does not possess significant anti-armor assets, this is the most efficient 
method of employing tanks in the attack. Since the tank carries three machine guns and a 
large amount of ammunition, the crew is capable of suppressing the enemy while an 
infantry force assaults the objective. While tank forces employing the M60Al routinely 
conducted support by fire operations, they were limited because the M60Al only carried 
two machine guns and half as much machine gun ammunition as the MIAI. The increased 
range and lethality ofthe MIAI's main gun over the M60Al's main gun further improves 
the tank forces ability to conduct a support by fire. 
4. Reconnaissance 
The MIAI is capable of supporting two forms of reconnaissance: reconnaissance 
by fire and reconnaissance in force. Reconnaissance by fire is designed to force the enemy 
to return fire, exposing his position and type of weapons employed. Since the enemy may 
perceive the tank as the main attack force, the enemy will hopefully respond with his most 
lethal weapons. This reaction will allow the tank crew to identify the enemy's position and 
weapons. Since the MIAI's main gun is capable of long range engagements, the crew can 
conduct reconnaissance by fire without coming within range of enemy conventional 
weapons, such as tanks or reconnaissance vehicles. In close terrain, the tank's machine 
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guns can be employed to draw enemy fire while the armor will protect the crew from 
enemy machine gun and ATGM fires. 
Reconnaissance in force is a deliberate attack designed to gain information on the 
enemy without becoming decisively engaged. The MlAl tank's mobility, speed, and 
firepower allow the crew to quickly engage the enemy and then disengage, allowing them 
to gather knowledge on the enemy's strength, disposition, and weapons systems. 
Marine forces employing the M60Al rarely conducted reconnaissance operations 
because of this vehicle's inability to rapidly move over cross country terrain, its inability to 
engage targets at long ranges, its minimal amount of armor protection, and its lack of a 
thermal sight for use on an obscured battlefield. 
5. Exploitation 
Exploitation operations are conducted following an attack to completely destroy a 
disorganized and weakened enemy. Tanks can play a crucial role in combined arms 
exploitation operations. The MlAl's cross country speed of30 mph and 300 mile 
cruising range enable it to quickly maneuver behind the enemy's front line. The tank's 
ability to identify targets through battlefield obscuration, such as smoke and fire from the 
assault, will enable the crew to engage enemy vehicles and emplacements other weapons 
systems in the combined arms team are unable to identify. This is another operation the 
M60Al was less capable of conducting because of its limited speed, range, and lack of a 
thermal sight. Other assets in the MAGTF still do not possess the capability to identify 
and engage the enemy through battlefield obscuration, which makes the MlAl the ideal 
weapon system for leading an exploitation. 
6. Pursuit 
Pursuit operations employ two forces, a direct pressure force and an encircling 
force to destroy the remaining enemy elements after an attack. The direct pressure force 
engages the enemy while the encircling force maneuvers to hit the enemy's flank and rear 
while blocking possible avenues of escape. The MlAl is best utilized as an element in the 
direct pressure force, utilizing its mobility, firepower, and thermal sights to push the 
enemy into the encircling force. 
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Attack helicopters are the preferred weapon system for the encircling force. 
Although, under conditions which would not allow these systems to fly, such as heavy 
smoke or fog, tanks could successfully conduct this operation. The speed and 
maneuverability of the MlAl allows the tank force to quickly move around the enemy. 
Also, the capability of the MlAl's fire control system to identify and engage targets 
through smoke or fog provides an alternative to the MAGTF commander when attack 
helicopters are unavailable or cannot fly due to adverse conditions. 
7. Raid 
Raids are attacks deep into enemy territory, designed to achieve a specific 
objective, such as destruction of a command site or supply depot. The MlAl tank is an 
excellent weapon system for use in raids against high priority targets which must be 
destroyed immediately. 
Typically, raids are conducted by small, light forces which can attack a target and 
withdraw without being detected. This type of raid usually involves helicopters delivering 
the force or airplanes delivering smart munitions. Under poor weather conditions or 
different tactical situations, these aircraft may not be able to fly or may be committed 
elsewhere. 
The MlAl provides the MAGTF commander with an alternative weapon system 
for use under this scenario. The MlAl's speed and long range firepower will enable the 
crew to quickly reach the objective, destroy it, and return to friendly lines. The armor 
protection and high power communication capabilities of the MlAl will protect the crew 
from enemy fire during the raid and allow for coordination of supporting fire, if required. 
While the MlAl is not quiet and is not usually considered for use in covert operations, if a 
high speed avenue of approach, such as a road, is available to the target, the MlAl is 
capable of rapidly moving within range of and destroying the target. 
If the MlAl is employed in a raid, a tradeoff does exist. Because of the vehicles 
size and noise, the enemy may detect the tank and attempt to destroy it. This may force 
the tank crew to leave the vehicle behind while they egress back to friendly lines on foot. 
The priority of the target must be weighed against the probability of losing one or more 
MlAl's behind enemy lines when employing the MlAl in raid operations. 
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Once the Marine Corps fields the smart munitions and Multi-Function Laser 
System (MFLS) discussed in Chapter IV, the role of tanks in raid operations can expand. 
The smart munitions will allow the tank crew to engage targets beyond the line of sight, 
and the MFLS will allow the crew to laser designate the target for aircraft guided smart 
munitions. These improved capabilities may allow the MAGTF commander to conduct a 
raid at greater distances with fewer forces. It may even be possible to conduct the raid 
employing the smart munitions without ever crossing into enemy territory. The full extent 
ofthe MlAl's capability to conduct raids utilizing these improvements will only be known 
after they are fielded. 
8. Summary of Offensive Operations 
MlAl equipped tank forces are capable of conducting or supporting MAGTF 
forces employed in the operations discussed above. The application of their firepower, 
mobility, armor protection, and shock effect can contribute significantly to a combined 
arms force conducting these operations. The MlAl is far superior to any other weapon 
system in the GCE. Its ability to rapidly maneuver over most terrain and to identify and 
engage targets under most conditions make it necessary to consider employing the MlAl 
in any offensive operation conducted by the MAGTF. 
C. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS 
1. Overview 
Defensive operations are designed to force the enemy to fight on terrain the 
defending force has prepared. This terrain may be key tactical areas or an area where the 
defending force can canalize and stop the enemy. There are two primary types of 
defenses: a position defense and a mobile defense. Within each type of defense there are 
operations which tanks can perform in support of the MAGTF's defensive scheme. 
2. Position Defense 
Position defenses are designed to deny the enemy access to critical terrain. The 
position defense employs all elements of the combined arms team with weapons systems 
arranged to mutually support each other in order to mass fire on the enemy once in range. 
There are three elements of the position defense: the security force, the main battle force, 
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and the reserve. The MlAl tank can contribute to the position defense as part of each of 
these forces. 
a. Security Force 
Three types of security forces are employed in the position defense: 
covering forces, guard forces, and screening forces. The covering force operates in front 
of the defended position to engage, delay or disrupt the enemy. Tanks can contribute to 
covering force operations through the application of their mobility and long range 
firepower. The tank crew can maneuver in front of the position defense, rapidly identify 
and engage the enemy, and egress back to the defended position. 
The guard force protects the main force from observation, direct fire, and 
surprise attack. Typically the guard force is positioned along the flanks of the main force 
while a cover force operates in front of the main force. In the guard role, tanks can utilize 
their mobility and long range communication and observation capability to provide the 
position defense commander with intelligence on enemy movement and strength. The 
firepower of the MlAl's main gun allows the crew to engage an enemy conducting a 
surprise attack from the flank. The tank's mobility will allow the crew to continue to repel 
the enemy attack if it must withdraw back to the main battle force. 
Screening forces are employed to gain and maintain contact with the 
enemy, provide intelligence on the enemy's actions, and attack the enemy with supporting 
arms. The screening force will not engage the enemy unless required for self-defense. In 
the screening role, the MlAl's mobility, long range firepower, and communication 
capabilities allow the tank crew to operate forward of the main battle force to identify the 
enemy's movements while providing the force with enough firepower to protect itself from 
enemy attack. 
b. Main Battle Force 
The main battle force is arranged within the position defense to engage the 
enemy once he comes within range. While tanks possess significant firepower for use in 
this role, they are less effective in this role because of the limited maneuver space 
characteristic of a position defense. Tanks should not be employed as the main battle 
force unless the situation requires the use of their firepower. 
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c. Reserve 
The reserve force in the position defense is held behind the main battle 
force in an area protected from enemy direct fire. The reserve is employed to exploit 
enemy weaknesses once engaged by the main battle force, to reinforce the main battle 
force, or to serve as the counterattack force. Tanks are well suited to operate as the 
reserve force. Their speed and maneuverability allow the tank crew to quickly maneuver 
to the area where the enemy has become disorganized or where friendly forces require 
reinforcement. As the counterattack force, tanks can utilize their mobility and firepower 
to rapidly hit the enemy once he is within the main battle area. Since the position defense 
may disrupt the enemy's organization, his forces may not be prepared for a counterattack 
by tanks. The MAGTF commander can regain the initiative by employing the MlAl in 
the counterattack force. Since the tanks have not been previously engaged, they can 
quickly move to engage the disorganized enemy. 
3. Mobile Defense 
Unlike the position defense, which is designed to deny the enemy terrain, the 
mobile defense is designed to push the enemy into an area where he can be destroyed 
through offensive action by the defending force. The mobile defense employs forces 
which will disrupt, fix, and then destroy the enemy. Disruption of the enemy is conducted 
by a force similar to the security forces employed in the position defense. 
Fixing the enemy is conducted by forces employed along strong points to canalize 
and then stop the enemy's movement. The destruction of the enemy is then conducted by 
a counterattack or strike force. The MlAl is best employed as the counterattack or strike 
force in a mobile defense. The tank's mobility, firepower, and armor protection enable the 
crew to rapidly close on the fixed enemy and destroy him with main gun and machine gun 
fire. The armor protection will ensure the tank is capable of closing on the enemy while 
minimizing injury to the crew. The communication capabilities of the tank will further 
enhance the crew's ability to destroy the fixed enemy in the counterattack or strike role, 
through the coordination of supporting air and artillery fires. 
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4. Summary of Defensive Operations 
The MlAl can be employed in both a position or mobile defense as part of one or 
more of the elements discussed above. The significant offensive capabilities of the MlAl 
must be taken into consideration when employing the MlAl in these defenses. If tanks 
are employed as part of the main battle force, the mobility of the MlAl is not being fully 
utilized. If other assets with a high degree of mobility, such as attack helicopters, are 
available for conducting the counterattack, then it is feasible to employ the MlAl as part 
of the main battle force. If these assets are not available, MlAl equipped forces should be 
employed as the counterattack or strike force where their capabilities to rapidly maneuver 
and engage the enemy are maximized. 
The capability of the MlAl to rapidly maneuver against an enemy fixed within a 
defensive position, shoot on-the-move, and see through battlefield obscuration are all 
capabilities commanders employing the M60Al did not have. Therefore, the commander 
must consider the added capabilities of the MlAl over the M60Al in employing tanks in 
his defense. 
D. OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS 
1. Overview 
Other tactical operations are those operations which may be conducted during the 
offense, defense, or at times when the MAGTF is preparing for a new operation during the 
conduct of a campaign. The versatility of the MlAl will allow the tank crew to conduct a 
variety of operations which will support the MAGTF's ability to build combat power 
ashore, transition from the defense to the offense, and overcome enemy emplaced 
obstacles. 
2. Amphibious Operations 
Amphibious operations are conducted to place forces ashore for follow-on 
operations against the enemy. The amphibious operation may be conducted against an 
opposing force or without opposition. Under either scenario, amphibious operations 
require a great deal of planning and coordination to place sufficient combat power ashore. 
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Because oflimited ship-to-shore craft availability and the significant weight of the MlAl, 
tanks are not typically part of the initial wave of forces ashore. 
While these constraints do exist, the use of the MlAl's Deep Water Fording Kit 
provides some flexibility in landing tanks. The Deep Water Fording Kit provides the 
MlAl with the capability to disembark from a ship-to-shore craft which cannot land on 
the shore because of the beach gradient. As long as the craft can maneuver to an area 
where the water depth is 78 inches or less, the tank can move off the craft, into the water, 
and onto the beach. These operations were successfully conducted when a platoon of 
MlAls were deployed with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in 1995. [Ref 21:p.l] 
The MAGTF commander must also consider the enormous amount of combat 
power each tank brings to the battle in structuring the amphibious force. By putting a 
platoon of tanks ashore in the first waves of the assault, the MAGTF rapidly builds its 
combat power ashore. The MlAl, once ashore, can quickly move inland to provide a 
zone of protection for follow-on forces. Their armor protection and firepower can be 
employed to defeat the defending enemy forces. 
3. Breaching Operations 
Breaching operations are conducted to overcome enemy emplaced obstacles such 
as tank ditches, wire, and mines. The enemy may place the obstacles in an area where he 
can fire on the force that encounters the obstacle, or the enemy may place obstacles just to 
slow the opposing force. Once an obstacle is encountered, the MAGTF will conduct a 
breech ofthe obstacle using three forces: a support force, a breaching force, and an assault 
force. The MlAl can contribute to the success of each of these forces. 
a. Support Force 
The role of the support force is to provide fire support while the breach is 
being conducted. This fire support should suppress or destroy the enemy so that the 
breaching force can clear the obstacle without coming under fire from the enemy. The 
MlAl is a superb weapon system for use in this support role. The tank's main gun and 
machine guns can effectively suppress and destroy the enemy. The MlAl 's armor 
protection, mobility, and communication capabilities allow the tank crew to position the 
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tank where it can adequately support the breach force and coordinate supporting fires 
from air and artillery assets. 
b. Breach Force 
The breach force is task organized to overcome obstacles emplaced by the 
enemy. Tanks, along with infantry and combat engineer forces, are capable of quickly 
breaching most obstacles on the battlefield. The primary role of tanks as an element in the 
breach force is to clear mines with the Ml mine clearing blade. In addition to the tanks 
capability to clear mines within the obstacle, the tanks armor protection and 
communications allow the crew to maneuver to the edge of the obstacle and provide 
intelligence to the MAGTF commander on the structure of the obstacle. The armor 
protection, in conjunction with suppressive fires provided by the support force, allows the 
tank crew to collect this intelligence while minimizing injury to crew members or damage 
to the vehicle. 
Once the breach force tanks are positioned at the edge of the obstacle, they 
can provide close in fire support to the combat engineers and infantry clearing other 
portions of the obstacle. The MlAl's smoke generating capability allows the crew to 
create a smoke screen between the breach force and the enemy, further minimizing the 
breach forces' probability of being successfully engaged by the enemy. The success of this 
smoke screen is dependent on favorable weather conditions which carry the smoke in the 
enemy's direction. 
c. Assault Force 
The role of the assault force is to rapidly move through the obstacle once it 
has been cleared and assault the enemy. The Ml_Al is an excellent weapon system for 
conducting the assault portion of a breaching operation. The tank's capability to rapidly 
accelerate and fire on-the-move through battlefield obscuration allows the tank crew to 
engage and destroy the enemy as the assault force moves through and clears the obstacle. 
4. Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) 
Military operations on urban terrain are conducted to attack an enemy defending a 
built-up area such as a town or city. This type of operation is conducted predominately by 
the infantry, requiring building by building movement to clear the enemy as the force 
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moves through the area. Typically, tanks are employed in MOUT as a direct fire support 
asset, providing fires from outside of the built-up area in support of the infantry. Tanks 
can also be used to protect high speed avenues of approach the enemy may use to 
conduct a counterattack. 
While these roles are the most traditional employment techniques for tanks in 
MOUT, the MlAl is capable of operating within the built-up area as a close-in fire 
support asset to the infantry. A tank section (two MlAls) may provide a significant 
advantage to an infantry platoon conducting MOUT. The tank's thermal sight assists the 
crew in identifying enemy positions. The crew can fire HEAT rounds to create holes in 
buildings and destroy barricades. The tanks three machine guns can provide suppressive 
fires for the infantry. The tanks smoke generating capability can create a smoke screen to 
cover the movement of the infantry. The MlAl's mine clearing blade can clear mines and 
smash through barricades. 
The shock effect of the MlAl can create a psychological advantage to the 
supported infantry and a psychological burden for the enemy. The supported infantry gain 
this advantage because of the knowledge that they have a highly lethal weapon system in 
direct support of their effort. The enemy experiences shock effect because of their 
inability to destroy the tank due to its armor protection. The enemy's machine gun fire and 
shoulder fired anti-tank weapons aimed at the frontal armor will have little effect on the 
MlAl. 
In 1992 the Army conducted an operation in a MOUT environment to test the 
feasibility of employing the MlAl in this type of operation. The results were significant. 
An infantry platoon of twenty-five men attacking a five to ten man enemy force without 
tank support suffered ten to twenty-five casualties and ultimately failed. The same size 
force attacking with tank support succeeded in destroying the enemy while suffering no 
more than three casualties. [Ref 17:p. 24] 
These tests further concluded that the best task organization for MOUT was a tank 
section in support of each infantry platoon. In addition to the added firepower the MlAl 
provided during these tests, the MlAl was utilized as an emergency evacuation platform, 
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a logistics carrier, and as an escort platform. These innovative employment techniques 
demonstrate the inherent versatility of the MlAl. 
While these tests were significant, limitations do exist in the employment of the 
MlAl in MOUT. The enemy may employ anti-tank missiles against the tanks. While the 
MlAl's frontal armor will protect it from ATGMs, an ATGM fired at the rear or side of 
the MlAl could disable the tank, limiting its ability to support the infantry. To minimize 
the effects of ATGMs, tanks should move with the infantry, ensuring no enemy is able to 
engage the tanks from the rear or sides. 
Training for this creative type ofMlAl employment is rarely conducted in the 
Marine Corps, but must be considered to ensure the MAGTF is utilizing all available 
assets during MOUT. 
5. Transition Operations 
Transition operations are those operations conducted throughout the battle to 
reposition forces, overcome natural obstacles, or reorganize. These types of operations 
include passage oflines, relief in place, withdrawal, linkup, hasty river crossing, and 
assembly area operations. These operations require the flexibility and versatility of a 
weapon system capable of overcoming natural obstacles, conducting operations at night 
and during periods of limited visibility, and providing support to other forces. The MlAl 
is capable, in concert with other forces of the combined arms team, of successfully 
participating in these operations. 
6. Summary of Other Tactical Operations 
The MlAl is capable of conducting or supporting operations such as amphibious 
operations, breaching operations, Military Operations on Urban Terrain, and transition 
operations. With the inclusion of the MlAl in each of these operations, the firepower, 
mobility, and survivability of the force will be enhanced. 
E. OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (OOTW) 
1. Overview 
Operations Other Than War is a broad term used to describe those operations not 
involving direct conflict with an enemy, such as promoting regional stability, supporting 
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democratic initiatives and objectives, retaining U.S. influence, providing humanitarian 
assistance, and assisting civilian authorities. Recent Operations Other Than War where 
the MlAl has been employed include Operation Restore Hope in Somalia to provide 
humanitarian assistance and Operations in Bosnia to support NATO's implementation of 
the Dayton peace agreement. These operations utilized the MlAl 's versatility to conduct 
show of force, quick reaction, patrol, and convoy escort operations. 
2. MlAls in Somalia 
The Marine Corps employed a platoon ofMlAls in Somalia during Operation 
Restore Hope in 1993. The most effective task organization was usually a tank section 
supporting an infantry company. The shock effect from the MlAl helped to deter 
aggression by belligerent forces and provide a psychological advantage to the supported 
infantry. The tanks mobility and breaching capabilities allowed the tanks to maneuver 
unimpeded throughout the city, overcoming road blocks and debris emplaced by forces 
opposed to the Marines' presence. The tank's thermal sight enabled the crew to identify 
potential threats to the Marine infantry patrols, allowing the crew to alert the infantry of a 
possible ambush site or sniper position. The tank's armor protection and size drew the fire 
from belligerent forces away from the infantry towards the vehicle. Since the armor 
protects the crew against small arms fire and fragmentation, this method of employment 
proved very successful in relieving pressure on the infantry without forcing the tanks to 
return fire. The heavily armored MlAl discouraged the use of anti-tank weapons and 
mines the belligerent forces may have considered employing. [Ref 9:p. 7] 
On occasion, tank forces were used to conduct firepower demonstrations. The 
MlAl 's mobility and firepower enabled the crew to quickly maneuver to an area to 
conduct demonstrations utilizing the tank's machine guns. While the main gun was not 
employed during Operation Restore Hope, its presence served as a further indication of 
the Marines' resolve to protect its forces. 
The employment of the MlAl as part of a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) provides 
immediate support to a friendly force which has become engaged. On October 3rd, when 
Army Ranger helicopters were shot down and the soldiers killed by belligerents, the Army 
had to organize an extraction force using Malaysian and Pakistani units equipped with 
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tanks. Lack of an armor supported QRF is considered to be one of the contributing 
factors to the casualties which occurred. [Ref 18:p. 58] 
The MlAl was also employed as a convoy escort. In this role the tank's cruising 
range, mobility, and thermal sight were utilized to assist with convoy security. The tank 
could quickly destroy roadblocks, identify potential ambush sights, and engage belligerent 
forces, if necessary. 
The tank was also employed in some rather unconventional methods. Tanks were 
used to clear trails by beating down overgrown brush. The MlAl was also used to 
remove abandoned vehicles which were blocking intersections and main roads. These 
actions demonstrated the Marines' willingness to assist the locals. [Ref 9:p. 5] 
The MlAl s employed in Somalia demonstrated the versatility of tanks in OOTW. 
Those involved in this operation consider the tank to be a critical element in the conduct 
of a successful operation in an environment such as Somalia. While many consider the 
tank to be an offensive weapon only for use in war against mechanized forces, the Marines 
who employed the MlAl in Operation Restore Hope proved the tank can contribute to 
the success of the MAGTF in OOTW. 
3. MlAls in Bosnia 
The Army began employing two battalions ofM1A1 tanks along with other 
vehicles of the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia in December, 1995. Their mission is to 
enforce the peace agreement reached at the Dayton peace accord as part of a multinational 
force under the direction ofNATO. The M1A1 has been used very effectively during this 
peace enforcement operation. The tanks have been employed as mobile check points and 
road blocks; and with the use of the Army's mine roller system for the MlAl, tanks have 
succeeded in clearing roads blocked by mine fields. 
The majority of the MlAls in Bosnia are being employed as part of a QRF, 
allowing the commander to rapidly reinforce areas or protect soldiers who come under 
hostile fire. Their most significant contribution is their presence. This presence is a 
psychological advantage to U.S. forces who are familiar with the MlAl 's capabilities and 
know it can quickly come to their aid if required. [Ref 19:p. 10] While most types of 
operations conducted in Somalia with the M1A1 have not been required in Bosnia, the 
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ability of this tank to conduct operations to protect U.S. forces if required make the 
employment of the MlAl crucial in peace enforcement operations. 
4. Summary of Tanks in OOTW 
The use of the MlAl in Somalia and Bosnia are two excellent examples of the 
tank's flexibility in supporting operations which do not involve typical combat operations. 
The MlAl is an extremely versatile weapon system which could play a decisive role in any 
Operation Other Than War. Similar to tank employment against a known enemy in a 
combat environment, tank employment in OOTW must be conducted in support of and 
with the support of the infantry. One-dimensional forces should never be employed, 
particularly in OOTW, where the situation can quickly change from peace to conflict. 
F. EMERGING OPERATIONS 
1. Overview 
Emerging operations are those operations which are being developed for future 
use. The Marine Corps recently established the Commandant's Warfighting Lab (CWL) to 
experiment with new operational concepts in an effort to better employ emerging 
technology and address future threats. The Marine Corps is also in the process of 
developing a new form of amphibious operation, Operational Maneuver From The Sea 
(OMFTS). The MlAl has potential to be employed in these emerging operations. 
2. Commandant's Warfighting Lab Initiatives 
The CWL envisions the future battlefield as lethal, chaotic, opportunistic, 
asymmetric, and public in both low and high intensity situations. The mission of the CWL 
is to evaluate new operational concepts and technologies and assess their applicability and 
value to tactics, techniques, procedures, and organization of the operating forces. [Ref 
20:p. 2] 
a. Engagement Coordination 
One of the objectives of the CWL is to experiment with new methods of 
coordinating fires from artillery, naval gun fire, and aircraft. This experiment is designed 
to utilize emerging digital communication technologies to rapidly engage the enemy with 
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smart guided and conventional munitions. While this experiment is focused on employing 
small infantry forces in teams which are easily emplaced and extracted, the role of tanks 
should be considered in future operations requiring laser designation for smart munitions 
and digital communication. 
The MlAl has the communication capability to transmit information 
digitally for coordinating these types of engagements, which meets the CWL's desire to 
digitally coordinate fires. With the addition of the MFLS and smart tank rounds, the tank 
crew will have the capability to laser designate for aircraft delivered smart munitions and 
engage targets beyond the line of sight with the STAFF round. The advantage of utilizing 
the MlAl in engagement coordination over a light infantry force is the inherent protection 
and mobility the MlAl provides the crew. 
b. Non-Lethal Weapons 
The CWL is also considering the employment of non-lethal weapons 
designed to impose the Marines' will on others without injuring the opposing force. This 
experiment is designed to explore the benefits of new non-lethal weapons, such as foam 
guns or non-toxic sprays, for use in operations such as riot control. 
The MlAl may not seem like a logical choice when deploying forces to 
control, without harming, people. The MlAl does, however, possess some unique 
capabilities which could be employed to control a crowd. The MlAl's ability to 
intimidate is a significant non-lethal method of crowd control. Army forces in Bosnia 
create this shock effect by simply driving the MlAl s through areas where belligerents may 
exist. The theory is, if these people see the size and hear the noise of the MlAl, they will 
think twice before opposing the peace force. The tank's smoke generating capability and 
high temperature exhaust, when directed towards the opposition, are other capabilities 
which could be employed to disrupt a crowd. Marines who employed the MlAl in 
Somalia considered this to be an excellent way of dispersing a crowd. They sighted the 
tank's size, noise, and hot exhaust as the characteristics which enabled them to control the 
crowd without inflicting serious or permanent injuries. [Ref 2l:p. 5] 
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c. CWL Summary 
The operations discussed are only two of the many experiments the CWL is 
considering in developing new operational concepts. The employment of the MlAl is not 
feasible in all operations. It is, however, one of the most technologically advanced 
weapon systems in the MAGTF, and should be considered as new operational concepts 
develop. 
3. Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) 
Operational maneuver from the sea is the application of maneuver warfare to 
operations in a maritime environment. The objective is to conduct a seamless operation 
from the sea to an objective inland without the requirement to land a force, buildup 
combat power ashore, and then move inland towards the objective. [Ref 4:p. 4-1] 
Operational requirements include the concentration of firepower at the decisive point, 
application of shock effect to overcome enemy resistance at the beach, and flexibility to 
exploit enemy weaknesses as they are discovered inland. The MlAl is an excellent 
weapon system for meeting these requirements. [Ref 4:p. 4-6] 
The MlAl creates an enormous amount of shock effect when employed. The 
speed and cross country mobility of the MlAl will allow the crew to rapidly move inland 
and mass its fires at the decisive time and place. Furthermore, the MlAl is a flexible 
weapon system, capable of engaging most threat weapons systems on the battlefield. As 
these threat systems improve, the MlAl will improve as well, providing the MAGTF 
commander with the ability to mass fires, conduct long range engagements, and coordinate 
indirect fires from greater distances. 
The difficulty in employing the MlAl in OMFTS is the limited number of 
ship-to-shore craft capable of rapidly transporting the MlAl ashore. While some craft are 
capable of carrying the MlAl, the capacity of these craft is rapidly utilized by the large 
and heavy MlAl. As such, the type of combat power needed ashore must be weighed 
against the capacity of each craft available to the commander. 
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4. Summary of Emerging Operations 
The experimentation with new operational concepts by the Marine Corps is a 
critical step in the process of ensuring Marines employed in all environments are well 
equipped and trained to win and survive in future conflicts. Continuous experimentation 
and evaluation to maximize the MIAI's utility in future conflicts will serve the Marine 
Corps well. 
G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed a variety of operations tanks could perform in support of 
the MAGTF. The MIAI is a highly versatile weapon system which has the potential to be 
employed in conflicts ranging from high-intensity war against a sophisticated enemy to 
low-intensity peace enforcement operations in third world countries. In each operation 
discussed, the employment of tanks must be done in conjunction with other forces, 
including infantry, artillery, and aircraft. 
Tanks are capable of conducting these operations in missions which utilize the tank 
as a maneuver element, an infantry support element, or as an anti-armor element. While 
not every possible operation the MAGTF could be tasked with conducting has been 
discussed, those which could most benefit from the firepower, mobility, armor prote~tion, 
and shock effect of the MIAI have been presented. Table 2 summarizes the operations 
which the MIAI could perform and the capabilities of the MIAI which contribute to the 
success of each operation. 
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Operation Firepower Mobility Armor Shock Communications 
Effect 
Movement to Contact X X X X 
Attack X X X X X 
Reconnaissance X X X X 
Exploitation X X X X 
Pursuit X X X X 
Raid X X X X 
Security X X X X 
Position Defense X X X X 
Mobile Defense X X X X 
Amphibious X X X X X 
Breaching X X X X 
MOUT X X X X X 
Transition X X 
OOTW X X X X X 
Engagement Coordination X X X X 
Non-lethal Weapons X X X 
OMFTS X X X X X 
Table 2. Summary ofMlAl capabilities utilized to conduct each operation. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The primary purpose of this thesis was to analyze those operations the MlAl tank 
could perform in support of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. The research and 
analysis demonstrate the MlAl's ability to conduct or support operations along the entire 
spectrum of warfare. While the MlAl is most capable of conducting high-intensity 
operations in war, it is a versatile weapon system capable of supporting forces and 
operating in environments not normally considered, such as peacekeeping and Military 
Operations on Urban Terrain. 
The MlAl is capable of conducting or supporting offensive, defensive, and other 
tactical operations. Some of the operations discussed include a movement to contact, 
reconnaissance, position and mobile defenses, amphibious operations, and breaching 
operations, among others. In each operation, the MAGTF benefits from the MlAl's 
firepower, mobility, armor protection, shock effect, and communication capabilities to 
rapidly shape the battle in the MAGTF's favor. 
While one or more characteristics of the MlAl may contribute most to the 
MAGTF's success for each particular operation discussed, such as the vehicle's firepower 
and mobility in conducting a movement to contact, the versatility of the MlAl enables it 
to conduct or support virtually any operation the MAGTF may be tasked with conducting. 
It is this versatility which must be considered when MAGTF commanders structure their 
force to accomplish the mission at hand. 
In addition to the thesis' primary purpose, four subsidiary research questions were 
addressed. The first dealt with exploring what operations the MlAl is capable of 
conducting or supporting outside of typical tank operations. The analysis provided insight 
into the employment of the MlAl in Operations Other Than War, Military Operations on 
Urban Terrain, and several emerging operations currently under consideration by the 
Commandant's Warfighting Lab. 
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The second and third subsidiary research questions prompted a critical look at 
what are the current and future capabilities of the Marines' MlAl tank. The current 
MlAl tanks employed by the Marines possess the armor protection, mobility, and 
firepower required to counter current threat weapon systems. The vehicle's survivability 
features enable the tank crew to employ it in operations previously not possible. The 
MlAl's lethality enables the crew to engage enemy forces at greater ranges with more 
accuracy. The mobility of the MlAl enables the tank crew to operate in virtually any 
environment at speeds which facilitate rapid destruction of the enemy. Future 
modifications will enable the tank crew to see further, engage targets at greater distances, 
operate under the most adverse weather and battlefield conditions, and improve the 
reliability of the vehicle. 
The fourth subsidiary research question developed analysis on the MlAl's role in 
the Marine Corps' evolving doctrine of Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS). 
Since each MlAl possesses a significant amount of firepower and mobility, the 
employment of the MlAl in OMFTS will enable the MAGTF commander to rapidly mass 
fires deep into enemy territory. The analysis also addressed the challenges associated with 
placing the MlAl ashore via ship-to-shore craft. Since OMFTS is still in the 
developmental stage, further analysis is required to understand the appropriate use of the 
MIAI in OMFTS. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The capabilities of the MlAl will continue to improve as technology develops and 
fiscal resources become available. As OMFTS doctrine develops, the employment of the 
MlAl must be studied. To address these areas, a follow-on study should ask the 
following questions: 
1. What technological improvements should be made to the MlAl to support 
emerging operations? 
2. How can the MlAl be transported from ship-to-shore during OMFTS without 
constraining the MAGTF's ability to place other assets ashore? 
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Additionally, further research should be conducted to determine the most effective 
method of employing the MlAl in military operations on urban terrain and in operations 
other than war. These are areas where the MlAl is well suited for use, but where limited 
experience exists on the best methods of employment. 
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APPENDIX A. MlAl DRAWINGS AND PICTURES 
This appendix is provided to assist those readers not familiar with the components 
of the MlAl tank discussed throughout this thesis. 
Figure 1. Left side view ofMlAl Tank. [Ref 7:p. 2-2] 
Figure 2. Right side view ofMlAl Tanlc [Ref 7:p. 2-2] 
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Figure 3. MlAl Tank External Features. [Ref 7:p. 2-5] 


























Figure 5. MlAl Tank Turret Structural Features. [Ref 7:p. 3-32] 
Figure 6. M240 Loader's Machine Gun. [Ref 6:p. 3-104] 
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Figure 7. M2 Commander's Machine Gun. [Ref 6:p. 3-105] 
Figure 8. MIAI Tank with Mine Clearing Blade installed. [Ref 6:p. 139] 
64 
Air intake ducts Exhaust duct 










































APPENDIX B. LIST OF ACRONYMS 
Aid Target Recognition 
Anti-tank Guided Missile 
Aviation Combat Element 
Combat Service Support Element 
Command Element 
Commandant's Warfighting Lab 
Deep Water Fording Kit 
Digital Electronic Control Unit 
Driver's Thermal Viewer 
Explosively Formed Penetrator 
External Auxiliary Power Unit 
Field Manual 
Fiscal Year 
Fleet Marine Force 
Fleet Marine Force Manual 
Foreign Object Damage 
Forward Looking Infrared 
Ground Combat Element 
High Explosive Anti-tank 
High Frequency 
Low Intensity Conflict 
Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
Marine Expeditionary Unit 
Military Operations on Urban Terrain 
Multi-Function Laser System 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Night Vision and Electronics Office 
Night Vision Lab 
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 
Operational Handbook 
Operational Maneuver From the Sea 
Operations Other Than War 
Position Location and Reference System 
Pulse Jet Air System 
Quick Reaction Force 
Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System 
Smart Target Activated Fire and Forget 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
Ultra High Frequency 
67 
68 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
Number of Copies 
1. Defense Technical Information Center............................................................... 2 
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., Ste 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox Library......................................................................................... 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Rd. 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
3. Director, Training and Education....................................................................... 1 
MCCDC, Code C46 
1019 Elliot Rd. 
Quantico, VA 22134-5027 
4. Director, Marine Corps Research Center.. .......................................................... 2 
MCCDC, Code C40RC 
2040 Broadway Street 
Quantico, VA 22134-5107 
5. Director, Studies and Analysis Division.............................................................. 1 
MCCDC, Code C45 
3 00 Russell Road 
Quantico, VA 22134-5130 
6. Curricular Officer, Code 36 ................................................................................ 1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5002 
7. LTC Greg Walls, Code SM!Wl........................................................................... 1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
8. Professor James E. Suchan, Code SM/Sa........................................................... 1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
9. Captain Wade Foster......................................................................................... 2 
800 Ridgeside Road 
Milford, MI 48353 
69 
10. Commanding Officer (Attn: ATZK-MC)......................................................... 1 
Building 2350 Bailey Hall 
US Army Armor Center 
Fort Knox, KY 40121-5200 
11. Inspector-Instructor.......................................................................................... 1 
4th Tank Battalion 
45482 Hercules Rd., Suite #2 
San Diego, CA 92145-5680 
12. Colonel Diggs................................................................................................... 1 
1524 Visotano 
Oceanside, CA 92055 
13. Major F. Milburn.............................................................................................. 1 
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (POE-27) 
2 Navy Annex 
Washington, DC 20380-1775 
14. LtCol D.W. Beal............................................................................................... 1 
PM, Tank systems (CBGT) 
MARCORSYSCOM 
2033 Barnett Road 
Quantico, VA22134 
15. Major P.M. Patch.............................................................................................. 1 
Requirements Division (C 443) 
3 3 00 Russell Road 
MCCDC 
Quantico, VA 22134 
16. Major R.S. West............................................................................................... 1 
Standards Branch (C 461G) 
Training & Education Division, MCCDC 
2008 Elliot Road (Suite 119) 
Quantico, VA 22134-5029 
17. Major S.M. Sessis......... .... .............. .. .... ...... .. . . .. . . .. .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . .. .. . .. . . .. . ..... 1 
Amphibious Warfare School 
2077 Geiger Road, MCCDC 
Quantico, VA 22134 
70 
18. Major R. Angel................................................................................................. 1 
USMC LNO to the USAARMC 
Directorate ofForce Development 
Bldg. 11 09-C, Room C-14 
Attn: ATZK-FDL 
Fort Knox, KY 40121-5200 
19. LtCol T.F. Thaler.............................................................................................. 1 
2nd Tank Bn, 2nd Mar Div 
PSC Box 20091 
Camp Legeune, NC 28542-0091 
20. LtCol R. Carlton............................................................................................... 1 
1st Tank:Bn, lstMarDivFwd 
MCAGCC Box 788260 
Twentynine Palms, CA 92278-8260 
21. LtCol J. McNeal................................................................................................ 1 
Inspector I Instructor 
8th Tank Bn 4th Mar Div 
439 Paul Road 
Rochester, NY 14624-4790 
22. Capt D.S. Sylvester........................................................................................... 1 
24 Bedford Drive 
Palm Coast, FL 32137 
23. Capt M.C. Goodpasture ..................................................................................... 1 
XOMCSFCo 
PSC 819 Box 13 
FPO AE 09645-2700 
71 
